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INTRODUCTION

The issue of discovery cost allocation, long ignored by both courts
and scholars, has become something of a cause celebre in the last few
years. An article which I coauthored on the subject was part of that
renewed interest.' In 2011, my former student, Colleen McNamara, and
I wrote an article urging a dramatic change not only in the manner of
how discovery costs are allocated, but an entirely new way of
understanding the concept of discovery costs. 2 Since the original
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, it has
been universally assumed that discovery costs appropriately lay where
they fell. In other words, producing parties always bore the costs
involved in producing the discovery sought by the requesting party. But
it was not as if either the courts, scholars, or rulemakers ever thought
this matter through. Indeed, no Federal Rule explicitly dealt with the
issue, and as far as my coauthor and I were able to ascertain, no one
ever thought seriously about the allocation of discovery costs.
Even in later years, when the burdens, costs, and inefficiencies
of the discovery process (especially in complex cases) became a serious
concern, few thought to turn to discovery cost allocation as a potential
means of ameliorating the problem. This was so even though seemingly
countless other alternatives were attempted-generally with little
success. 3 Now that some have recognized the possible value of discovery
cost allocation in the fight against burdensome and excessive discovery,
they still usually employ what I deem to be the misnomer of "cost
shifting." In the approach that my coauthor and I developed, imposing
1.
Even to the extent I can legitimately take credit, I should note that much of this interest
may be due to others being stimulated to attempt to point out the flaws in my reasoning. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Spencer, RationalizingCost Allocation in Civil Discovery, 34 REV. LITIG. 769 (2015).
2.
Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation
and Modern ProceduralTheory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011).
3.
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (requiring that a complaint
allege a plausible, not only conceivable, set of facts to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted); Martin H. Redish, Pleading,Discovery, and the FederalRules: Exploringthe Foundation
of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845 (2012) (arguing that heightened pleading standards are
an inadequate gatekeeping mechanism for protecting against excessive discovery abuse).
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the costs of discovery on the requesting party (at least where the
discovery aids only the requesting party) is not a matter of shifting
costs, because use of that word necessarily implies that the costs, as an
original matter, were appropriately attributed to the producing party.
Nothing, we argued, could be further from the truth. Rather, as a
matter of both legal and moral theory, such costs are appropriately
deemed to be those of the requester, not the producer. That
circumstances required the producer to lay out the initial expenditure
4
for production mattered not at all in that characterization.
In addition to the moral and conceptual arguments we mounted
in support of imposing discovery costs on the requesting party as long
as the resulting discovery exclusively benefited that party, we argued
that use of such an approach would internalize discovery costs, thereby
removing externalities that result in severely excessive and inefficient
discovery.6
We were certainly not alone in calling for a reexamination
(ignoring the fact that there actually had never been any examination
in the first place).6 As a result, the Rules Advisory Committee
recommended and the Supreme Court promulgated a modest
modification of Rule 26(c), disposing of any doubt about the district
court's legal authority to order cost shifting.7 But advocates of a
reallocation of discovery costs will have to wait for a later day to achieve
their goals.
A relatively small portion of our article raised a potential
constitutional issue inherent in the imposition of the costs of plaintiffs'
discovery requests on defendants.8 The constitutional argument was by
no means central to either our analysis or our ultimate
recommendation. Since the publication of our article, however, a
number of commentators have focused on the constitutional argument,
9
raising serious questions about its validity. Even though the
constitutional element of our argument was by no means essential to
its acceptance (nor even the primary basis we relied upon), I have
decided to use this opportunity to double down on the constitutional
challenge to the current system of discovery cost allocation. In doing so,

See Redish & McNamara, supranote 2, at 821.
4.
Id. at 798.
5.
See id.
6.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(B) (permitting courts to specify "terms, including time and
7.
place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery").
See Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 807 ("[I]mpos[ing] the nonreimbursable costs
8.
of plaintiffs discovery on the defendant on the basis of nothing more than the plaintiffs unilateral
allegation of liability surely takes defendant's property without due process.").
See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 1.
9.
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I significantly expand upon our relatively brief constitutional analysis
to underscore two central themes: (1) the Constitution plays a far more
important role in limiting or shaping modern civil procedure than most
jurists or scholars probably think, and (2) the current version of
discovery cost allocation raises serious constitutional concerns which
have never been thoroughly considered or to which no adequate
response has been fashioned.10 Briefly stated, the constitutional
challenges to the current system of discovery cost allocation fall within
three categories of individual rights: procedural due process," so-called
substantive due process, 12 and equal protection of the laws. 13
In this Article, I plan to view the challenge to the current
discovery cost allocation system exclusively through the lens of
constitutional analysis. An essential element of that approach turns on
acceptance of a subconstitutional argument fashioned in my prior work
on the subject: even though the producing party necessarily bears the
initial cost of producing requested discovery, to the extent that
discovery exclusively benefits the requesting party, those costs are
properly viewed, morally and legally, as the costs of the requesting
party. Once that premise is accepted (and for reasons discussed in my
earlier work and summarized below, I consider the argument
persuasive), it logically follows that the requirement that the producing
party, rather than the requesting party, ultimately bear those costs
constitutes a governmentally imposed subsidy of the requesting party
by the producing party. 14 Once that conceptualization is accepted, one
should be able to apply the previously mentioned constitutional
doctrines to understand why and how the current system clearly
violates constitutional directives. 15
While my prior work on the subject was predominantly about
the important need for the reconceptualization of discovery costs, this
Article is exclusively a study in constitutional law. The stakes in civil
litigation, while usually not rising to the level of those in criminal

10. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 805-12 (examining the due process concerns
implicated in cost allocation of discovery).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Id.
13. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. While no explicit equal protection clause binding the federal
government appears in text, the Supreme Court has long found such a limitation in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
(holding that racial segregation in public education is inconsistent with valid government
objectives and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
14. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 791-92 ("Because each party bears the costs of
producing the information that will be used against it by its opponent, each party effectively
subsidizes that portion of its opponent's case.").
15. See id.
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prosecutions, can be very high. Both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses apply with significant force to civil litigation,
because substantial property interests may be at stake. But equally
important is the need to have litigants believe in the legitimacy of the
litigation system, for without it we not only create new practical
dangers, we threaten to undermine the liberal social contract implicit
in our constitutional democracy.
The first Part of this Article lays the foundation for the more
specific constitutional analysis to follow by exploring the numerous
ways-including discovery-that the Constitution has shaped and
limited modern civil procedure. The second Part briefly reprises the
reconceptualization of discovery cost allocation that my coauthor and I
proposed in our 2011 piece. Using that reconceptualization as a
foundation, the third Part analyzes our current system through the lens
of constitutional law. Because the underlying purpose of the current
system is ambiguous, however, my constitutional analysis will have to
include incorporation of some reverse engineering in an effort to
determine what goals our current system is seeking to attain. As such,
my constitutional critique will include several contingencies that take
the critique down different paths. But all of them end up at the
conclusion that the current system is unconstitutional.
I. CIVIL LITIGATION AND THE CONSTITUTION

It is probably safe to assert that, as a general matter, scholars
do not view civil litigation through the lens of constitutional law. Rarely
do issues of civil litigation receive attention in constitutional law
casebooks, and when they do the discussion is relatively brief. While
there exists some overlap between constitutional and civil procedure
scholars, most constitutional scholars write only rarely about procedure
and vice versa. The fact remains, however, that the Constitution plays
an important role in controlling procedure in civil litigation in two
different ways. On the one hand, constitutional provisions-for
example, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause 16 and the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trials in civil cases 1 7-directly shape civil
procedure doctrine.
Virtually all of modern personal jurisdiction doctrine is, at its
foundation, a matter of due process, and has been since the Court's
famed decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.18 Indeed, absent such constitutional

16.
17.
18.

U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
Id. amend. VII.
95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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grounding, the United States Supreme Court would lack authority to
limit the reach of state court jurisdiction in the first place.1 9 The Court
has developed a complex doctrinal framework for shaping the required
elements of a hearing in civil cases and in so doing has imposed a
utilitarian-type calculus to determine what procedural protections
must be employed. 20 And while the Court's jurisprudence on the subject
may be less than clear, there is doubt that the Seventh Amendment
1
imposes a constitutional restriction on procedure in civil cases. 2
Arguably, the situation is different when a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure is involved. While of course as a theoretical matter the
Federal Rules are subject to the limits imposed by the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has noted that "the study and approval given each
proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and
this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to
Congress for a period of review before taking effect give the Rules
presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory
constraints." 22 But this statement fails to recognize that the Court
consciously construes ambiguous rules in a manner to avoid potential
constitutional difficulties. For example, the Court held that "Rule 37
should not be construed to authorize dismissal of [a] complaint because
of [a] petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production order when
it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability,
and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." 23 The
obvious concern was that imposing the serious penalty of dismissal for
a plaintiffs failure to comply with an order that was impossible to
satisfy could easily be found inherently unfair and therefore to violate
due process. Thus, to avoid finding an application of Rule 37

19. I developed this point more fully in Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and
PersonalJurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1114 (1981).
20. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 2 (1991) (striking down a state statute providing
for prejudgment attachment of real estate, absent prior notice or hearing, as inconsistent with due
process); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (maintaining that due process does not
require an evidentiary hearing in order to terminate social security disability benefits); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (holding that prejudgment replevin statutes denied one's due
process right to be heard, which is a prerequisite to taking one's property).
21. Cf. Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in
Non-Article III Proceedings:A Study in Dysfunctional Constitutional Theory, 4 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 407 (1995) (comparing the Court's treatment of non-Article III proceedings and concluding
that it is inconsistent with the due process guarantees of the Seventh Amendment).
22. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987) (citation omitted).
23. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958); see also Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067 (1979) (holding that a grossly negligent, as opposed to a willful, failure
to adhere to an order compelling discovery is sufficient to warrant severe sanctions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37).
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unconstitutional, the Court expressly construed the Rule to circumvent
the issue.
Despite the Court's strong presumption of constitutionality for
its promulgated rules, the Constitution thus remains the proverbial
elephant in the room where necessary, influencing how the rules are to
be construed. Before we consider my constitutional challenges to
traditional discovery cost allocation methodology, it is essential to
approach those challenges with a full understanding of the important
role the Constitution has long played in modern civil procedure. Not
only has the Constitution played such a role, it is vitally important to
recognize that it should play such a role. To be sure, the property
interests of the litigants are of both legal and practical significance,
expressly guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. But equally important
is the extent to which the governmentally established and administered
system of civil litigation fulfills the terms of the implicit social contract
between government and citizen in a liberal democratic society. The
procedural system is designed to implement the network of substantive
rights and restrictions in a fair and efficient manner. To deprive a
litigant of her property without first providing that litigant with a full
and complete opportunity to defend herself or to establish the absence
of any justification for the deprivation undermines the liberal
democratic system in two important ways. First, it undermines the
respect that a representative and accountable government must show
its citizens. Second, it increases the risk of reaching an inaccurate
decision, thereby either under- or overenforcing the underlying
substantive rights and restrictions. In so doing, the system threatens to
disrupt substantive lawmaking of the bodies most representative of and
accountable to the electorate. Hence the Constitution's guarantee of due
process in particular stands as the fundamental guardian of the
democratic system in civil litigation.
Before we can understand how the current system of discovery
cost allocation violates important constitutional protections, however,
it is first necessary to understand why, at least in many instances, the
costs of discovery are properly seen, from the outset, as the costs of the
requesting party rather than the producing party. By this I do not mean
that we should shift costs; rather, I mean that regardless of which party
physically makes the initial expenditure, in the majority of instances
that cost, from the very moment the discovery request is made, is
properly viewed-both legally and morally-as the cost of the
requesting party. Only if this subconstitutional premise is accepted can
the due process and equal protection challenges I make to producerpays discovery cost allocation be understood.
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II. WHY DISCOVERY COSTS ARE PROPERLY DEEMED TO BE THE COSTS
OF THE REQUESTING PARTY, NOT THE PRODUCING PARTY
Imagine the following situation: Worker A informs his fellow
workers that he is about to go out for lunch and asks if he can pick up
anything for anyone. Worker B informs him that he would like a Big
Mac, large fries, and a strawberry shake. Worker A, as instructed,
purchases Worker B's order and gives it to him upon his return to the
office. Worker A used his own money to pay for Worker B's meal. To
whom is that cost appropriately attributed? Is it Worker A's cost,
because in doing a favor for Worker B that benefits Worker A in no
direct way, Worker A physically used his own money to pay for the food?
Can Worker B say to Worker A, "Since you used your own money to pay
for my food, the cost of my food is properly deemed to be yours, and you
cannot legally impose that cost on me"? Certainly as a legal matter,
were the case to be brought to small claims court, this would be
considered nonsense. It is also nonsensical on a purely moral level:
surely no one can deny Worker B's moral obligation to reimburse
Worker A for the money spent to purchase food asked for by Worker B
and exclusively for his benefit. The law synthesizes both the moral and
legal perspectives in the doctrine of quantum meruit. That doctrine
creates a quasi-contractual obligation in the absence of a formal
agreement that, as a matter of law, imposes on a party an obligation to
pay or reimburse another for efforts from which that party knowingly
benefitted. 24
Application of the quantum meruit principle to discovery
production should be obvious. Certainly the requesting party has no
basis for assuming that the responding party is doing him a favor by
producing requested discovery. To the extent that discovery exclusively
benefits the requesting party, there exists no moral or legal basis on
which to attribute the costs of production to the responding party.
Surely, the mere fact that the producing party necessarily incurs the
initial costs of production in no way leads to the conclusion that those
costs are morally attributable to that party. Thus, when the costs of
discovery benefiting the requesting party are imposed exclusively on
the producing party, the only way to conceptualize that transfer, both
legally and practically, is as a forced subsidization of the requesting
party's litigation costs. 25 With this understanding, we should be able to
24. Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 777.
25. It must be acknowledged that not all discovery exclusively benefits the requesting party.
It is certainly conceivable that discovery requested by one party may simultaneously benefit the
producing party in the sense that the producing party may find some of the material or information
produced strategically helpful. In such situations, the court would be called upon to allocate costs
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undertake our analysis of the constitutional implications of the
producer-pays model of discovery cost allocation.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK ON THE PRODUCER-PAYS APPROACH

TO DISCOVERY COST ALLOCATION

A. The Problem in Fashioninga ConstitutionalAttack
Challenging the constitutionality of the current producer-pays
cost allocation model is similar to attempting to punch a marshmallow:
you have trouble hitting anything with any force since there is nothing
to provide resistance. There is no rule or statute to challenge since the
current allocation practice is not embodied in either a rule or a statute.
There is no asserted justification for the current practice to critique for
the simple reason that no one has ever explained why the current
practice is what it is. No one ever made a formal decision to adopt a
producer-pays system; it just happened. More importantly, when
scholars do happen to discuss discovery cost allocation, few have
considered the possibility of conceptualizing the cost as being
attributable, in the first instance, to the requesting party, so no scholar
to date has deemed a producer-pays system a form of subsidization of
the requesting party, thereby avoiding any conceivable constitutional
concern.
Because of these factors, anyone who wishes to challenge the
constitutionality of the producer-pays model must initially (1) explain
how that model constitutes a deprivation of a litigant's property and
then (2) postulate conceivable justifications for having the producing
party subsidize the litigation expenses of his opponent. Only then can
the constitutional attack take shape, by explaining why those
conceivable rationales fail to justify the deprivation of the producing
party's property.
The second problem in shaping a constitutional challenge arises
because of current practice's uniform application to both plaintiffs and
defendants. Regardless of which party requests the discovery, the other
party is obligated to bear what should be deemed the requesting party's
costs. Constitutional challenges to the producer-pays practice zero in on
application of current practice to defendants. Thus, one first must
explain why those same constitutional challenges do not apply equally
to application of the producer-pays model to plaintiffs. Ultimately,
between the parties. But even in situations in which the discovery benefits both parties rather
than exclusively the requesting party, the fact remains that under the producer-pays model the
producing party bears not only his own costs but also the costs of producing materials that benefit
the requesting party.
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however, it is possible to deal with both of these problems, as the
following Section demonstrates.
B. Exploring the Potential ConstitutionalViolations
Two constitutional protections arguably apply to the current
producer-pays method of discovery cost allocation. The first, as a
conceptual matter, is equal protection. 26 The second and arguably more
important directive is the guarantee of procedural due process
embodied in the Fifth Amendment. 27 I will consider each one separately.
It will quickly become evident, however, that the two are actually
intertwined in an organic, symbiotic relationship.
1. Equal Protection
One might question the viability of any equal protection
challenge in this context because there appears to be no suspect
classification involved (that is, a classification based on race, religion,
or national origin), and nonsuspect classifications are generally
subjected to the traditionally very deferential "rational basis"
standard. 28 But that does not mean that the Court never invalidates
governmental classifications under rational basis review. 29 To the
contrary, there are a number of modern Supreme Court decisionsalbeit a small minority-invalidating nonsuspect classifications purely
26. It should be noted that purely as a textual matter, the federal government is not bound
by an equal protection directive. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by its
express terms limits only state action. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. Since 1954, the Supreme

Court, however, has made clear that it finds in the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause an
equal protection component. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (emphasizing that
equal protection and due process are not mutually exclusive and that "discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process"). While on a textual level one may raise legitimate
questions about such an interpretation, there exists no doubt that, purely as a matter of Supreme
Court doctrine, equal protection limits federal action as well as that of the state. Id. at 500.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (upholding a
statute because the legislature "thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way
to correct [an evil at hand]'). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is
Constitutional(andDesirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2016) (explaining that a law is valid
if it is a "reasonable way to accomplish" a legitimate government objective). Note that exclusively
in the area of discrimination based on sexual preference, the Supreme Court has purported to
invoke rational basis review in a manner that triggers relatively invasive review. See, e.g.,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down an amendment to a state constitution
that would prohibit the government from protecting "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual" people from
discrimination because it violated the Equal Protection Clause). The use of this "rational basis
with teeth" standard, however, has been confined to this area.
29. For an argument that the modern rational basis test should be strengthened as a
limitation on legislation, see Jeffrey D. Jackson, ClassicalRational Basis and the Right to Be Free
of ArbitraryLegislation, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 509 (2016).
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on the basis of rational basis review. It is true that under modern
rational basis doctrine, the reviewing court will postulate plausible
rationales for legislation, even if no evidence exists that the legislature
considered those rationales. But where no conceivable rationale for a
governmentally imposed classification makes rational sense, the Court
has held the classification unconstitutional, even under a rational basis
standard and even in the absence of a suspect or even near-suspect
classification.3 0
The producer-pays model of discovery cost allocation,
conceptualized as a required subsidization of costs appropriately
attributed to the requesting party, amounts to a governmentally
imposed classification of producing parties as litigants to be burdened
with what are in reality their opponents' costs. 31 The equal protection
challenge to a producer-pays model of discovery cost allocation proceeds
as follows: The costs associated with discovery requested by one party
for that party's exclusive benefit are, both as a legal and moral matter,
appropriately deemed the costs of the requesting party. Therefore a
decision to force those discovery costs upon the producing party, as both
a legal and practical matter, requires the producing party to subsidize
the requesting party's litigation costs. The only conceivably legitimate
justification for imposing such a subsidization process is the ex ante
assumption that the requesting party's costs must be subsidized. This
will of course not always be the case, however, since it is at least
conceivable that situations will arise in which the requesting party is

30. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (allowing an equal
protection claim and rational basis review for a "class of one" theory); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Cty. Comm'n of Webster Cty., 488 U.S. 336, 342 (1989) (finding an equal protection violation
for taxes assessed on a single property); Quinn v. Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (finding no
rational basis for a landownership requirement for eligibility for public office); Hooper v. Bernalillo
Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 621-22 (1985) (finding a distinction between New Mexico veterans
and other residents for tax purposes not rationally related to purported legislative goals);
Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27-28 (1985) (finding that a tax exemption afforded only to
Vermont residents constituted a valid equal protection claim); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65
(1982) (finding that Alaska's dividend distribution plan, which was based on years of residency
within the state, failed rational basis review); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538
(1973) (holding that a food stamp program that was designed to disadvantage "hippies" had no
rational basis); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 70, 74 (1972) (finding an equal protection violation
for a statute that classified real property tenants differently from other tenants).
31. Characterizing the imposition of the requester's costs on the producer as "governmentally
imposed" may seem somewhat strange, since no Federal Rule or congressional enactment actually
imposes such an obligation. But there is little doubt that in the overwhelming number of instances,
a party who fails to incur the cost of producing its opponent's requested discovery will be subject
to sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 unless the district court decides to "shift"
costs-a very rare event to this point. Thus, to the extent an organ of the government-the federal
judiciary-stands ready to coerce the producing party to produce the discovery requested by its
opponent fully at the producing party's own cost, current practice is appropriately characterized
as "governmentally imposed."
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far more financially well-off than the producing party. Thus, a blanket
requirement that the producing party must bear the costs of the
requesting party because of the requesting party's financial need for a
subsidy is at best overbroad, and therefore irrational. At the very least,
then, equal protection must require the court to make an initial
assessment as to whether subsidization is necessary.
In many instances, however, the producing party will be in a far
better financial position than the requesting party to bear the costs of
discovery, even for discovery that benefits only the requesting party. In
such a case, one might at first blush conclude that the reasons for such
a subsidization process are at the very least rational, if not compelling.
Absent subsidization of the requesting party, the requesting party will
be unable to afford the discovery and therefore the achievement of
justice may well be hindered.
That subsidization of the requesting party is rational, however,
does not automatically imply that the cost of the subsidy must be borne
by the producing party. It is at this point that equal protection review
is properly triggered. For one may accept, if only for purposes of
argument, that subsidization of financially needy requesting parties is
appropriate. But to justify the current producer-pays allocation model,
one must justify the classification that distinguishes between the
producing party and all other citizens in the nation. In other words, why
is it rational to impose what are properly conceived of as the needy
requesting party's costs on the producing party rather than on all
citizens through some sort of tax-based fund? In short, the question for
equal protection purposes is whether it is rational to distinguish
between an opposing litigant and the rest of society for purposes of
imposing the costs of subsidizing a needy requesting party's discovery
costs.
In answering that question, it is necessary to distinguish
between plaintiff-producers and defendant-producers. If one employs a
highly deferential approach to determining rationality, it appears likely
that a reviewing court would conclude that there is in fact a rational
basis for distinguishing plaintiffs from the rest of society: plaintiffs have
chosen to start the process in the first place; but for their actions, none
of these costs would have occurred. A reviewing court could therefore
reason that it is rational to impose a needy defendant's discovery costs
on a producing plaintiff rather than on the citizenry at large because
the plaintiff is the reason the litigation exists in the first place. In
concluding that this reasoning provides a rational basis to support a
distinction between producing plaintiffs and the rest of society, I in no
way mean to suggest that the basis for distinction is necessarily
persuasive. One could respond to this reasoning with the criticism that
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the plaintiff only brought the suit because of the defendant's fault. But
the defendant's fault is yet to be determined; all that is known for
certain at the discovery stage is that the plaintiff instituted the action.
Given the highly deferential nature of rational basis review, it is likely
that such a distinction would satisfy scrutiny under equal protection.
It is by no means as easy to distinguish defendant-producers
from the rest of society as it is to distinguish plaintiff-producers from
citizens in general, however. To support such a defendant-based
classification, the judiciary would need to show that once it is assumed
that needy plaintiffs must have costs properly deemed theirs
subsidized, there exists a rational basis for imposing those costs on the
defendant rather than on the rest of society. Even under the highly
deferential rational basis test, I submit, such a conclusion is far from
certain. By way of illustration, consider the following admittedly
extreme hypothetical: congress decides that a plaintiffs discovery costs
must be subsidized and determines that the subsidy will be provided by
one individual chosen at random from the pool of all citizens. No one
could possibly consider such a classification rational, even under the
highly deferential version of the rational basis test that currently
controls. Absent some basis for concluding that forcing the defendant to
subsidize the plaintiffs discovery costs is more rational than forcing a
randomly selected individual to do so, imposition of the subsidization
cost on the defendant cannot satisfy the rational basis test.
At first glance it might be thought that such a distinction is
easily justified. It is, after all, the defendant who presumably harmed
the plaintiff, thereby leading to institution of the suit in the first place.
Surely the same could not be said of the citizenry at large or an
individual citizen selected at random. But a more careful inquiry
quickly demonstrates the fallacy in such reasoning. On what basis are
we assuming that the defendant did in fact violate the plaintiffs legally
protected rights? At the point of discovery, nothing-or at least very
little 32-about that question has been litigated, much less resolved.
It is at this point in the analysis that the equal protection
inquiry begins to organically blend into the procedural due process
inquiry. The following Section explores the procedural due process basis
for finding that producer-pays discovery-when used against
defendants-is unconstitutional.

32.

See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
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2. Procedural Due Process
a. Subsidization as Property Deprivation
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 33 provides that
neither life, nor liberty, nor property may be deprived without due
process of law. It is, of course, by no means clear exactly what
procedures satisfy due process. What is clear at the outset is that the
inquiry cannot take place absent an initial finding that life, liberty, or
property have been taken. In the case of discovery cost allocation, that
finding turns on acceptance of the view, advocated by my coauthor and
myself in our prior scholarly work, that the costs associated with
producing discovery requested by a litigant for the sole strategic benefit
of that litigant are properly envisioned as the requesting party's costs,
even though the producing party must first lay out funds to pay for
those costs. 3 4 If that premise is not accepted, then the entire due process
argument collapses, for it is only when those expenses are properly
viewed as expenses of the requesting party that we can view the
producer-pays model of cost allocation as a subsidization of the
requester's costs. In other words, we need to determine that there has
been a deprivation of the defendant-producer's property before we can
trigger the inquiry into whether due process has been satisfied prior to
that deprivation. 35 Because the defendant-producer is forced to bear the
costs of producing the plaintiff-requestor's discovery that solely benefits
the plaintiff-requestor, it is proper to conclude that the judiciary has
forced the defendant to give its property to the plaintiff-requestor. In
other words, the defendant-producer's property has been taken and
transferred to the plaintiff-requestor. From this perspective, there is no
doubt that the defendant-producer has been deprived of property.

33. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The exact same constitutional analysis would apply to state
discovery cost allocation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id.
amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4, which for all intents and purposes is identical to the analysis under the
Fifth Amendment. But for present purposes, I confine my discussion to the Fifth Amendment since
the focus of my inquiry is on discovery cost allocation methodology in the federal courts.
34. Redish & McNamara, supra note 2, at 792.
35. I should emphasize that I here confine my analysis to defendant-producers because, as
previously discussed, imposition of a needy defendant's discovery costs on a plaintiff-producer
could be deemed rational, even if it were later determined that the defendant had violated the
plaintiffs rights, because it was the plaintiff who instituted the suit in the first place. See supra
Section III.B.1.

2018]

DISCOVERY COST ALLOCATION

1861

b. Litigation Procedureand ProceduralDue Process
As already noted, 36 the only conceivable basis for rationally
distinguishing a defendant-producer from society as a whole for
purposes of subsidizing the plaintiff-requestor's discovery is that the
defendant is somehow at fault, thereby justifying imposition of the
plaintiff-requestor's discovery costs as a form of penalty. But it is at this
point that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is triggered: a
party may not be deprived of its property without due process of law.
Has the defendant-producer been afforded procedural due process prior
to the preliminary determination that he is somehow at fault? On what
basis is it assumed that a defendant is at fault? On the basis of the
plaintiffs complaint? Surely the answer must be no, since at the outset
of the litigation the complaint serves as nothing more than a selfserving, unilateral document containing unchallenged and unvetted
allegations.
One might argue that litigants do not reach the discovery stage
until the defendant has had the opportunity to invoke Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by moving to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.3 7 Under this view,
the plaintiff-requestor's discovery costs cannot be imposed upon the
defendant unless (1) the defendant has made a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and
it has failed, or (2) the defendant has chosen not to make such a motion,
presumably because the defendant has determined that it would be
unsuccessful. Arguably, then, the defendant's opportunity to move to
dismiss provides the requisite procedural due process owed to the
defendant. But a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) makes no
inquiry into the factual merits of the plaintiffs claims against the
defendant. To the contrary, the accuracy of the complaint's
nonconclusory factual allegations is presumed valid, solely for purposes
of argument. 38 But it is quite conceivable that a plaintiff who survives
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may well lose on a motion for
summary judgment, 39 a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 40 or in
the fact finder's verdict at trial. In this context, it is important to point
out that a defendant who is forced to subsidize the plaintiffs discovery
following denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not reimbursed
at a later point, even if he wins on a motion for summary judgment or
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
38. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (assuming factual allegations
as true for the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
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judgment as a matter of law or in a verdict at trial. Thus, when a
defendant's subsidization of a plaintiffs discovery is framed in
procedural due process terms, it is Orwellian to suggest that the
opportunity to move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) satisfies that
requirement when the defendant is ultimately exonerated of any of the
plaintiffs claims against him.
c. Forced Subsidization and the Theory of ProceduralDue Process
i. A Review of the Premises That Trigger the Need for the
Due Process Analysis
Before we examine the relevance of procedural due process
theory to the context of discovery cost allocation, the framework of the
situation must be kept in mind:
(1) The costs of discovery that will benefit only the requesting
party are appropriately seen as the requesting party's costs,
even though the producing party initially incurs the costs of
producing.
(2) Under our current system, because the producing party is
generally unable to impose those costs on the requesting
party, the producing party is forced, as a practical matter, to
subsidize the litigation costs of the requesting party.
(3) Under a rational basis standard, it is at least plausible to
find such forced subsidization rational when the requesting
party is the defendant, since it is the plaintiff who instituted
the action in the first place. 4 1
(4) As to a defendant-producer, however, no similar rational
basis exists to distinguish the defendant from other citizens
as potential subsidizers of discovery costs properly deemed
the plaintiffs.
(5) The only conceivable basis for rationally distinguishing the
defendant from other citizens as a potential subsidizer of the
plaintiffs discovery costs is the defendant's alleged fault,
thereby justifying singling him out to bear those costs.
(6) Unless there exists a provable basis for concluding that the
defendant is somehow at fault, however, no rational basis

41. It should be emphasized that when I say such an approach is "rational," I in no way mean
to suggest that it is the correct or best way to deal with the situation. I mean only that under the
highly deferential rational basis test, one could deem such reasoning at the very least plausible, if
not ultimately persuasive.
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exists for requiring that the defendant subsidize discovery
costs properly seen as the plaintiff-requestor's.
But what is the factual basis for the conclusion that the
defendant is somehow at fault in order to justify imposition of the
plaintiffs discovery costs solely on the defendant? It is at this point that
the theory and doctrine of procedural due process is triggered, for
absent the provision of procedures that satisfy the requirements of due
process prior to a determination of the defendant's fault, it is
unconstitutional for government to deprive the defendant of his
property to subsidize what are properly deemed to be the plaintiffs
discovery costs. Because we must assume no fault on the defendant's
part at the point in the proceeding that subsidization by the defendantproducer is required, the defendant stands in no different position from
other members of society as the appropriate subsidizer of the plaintiffs
discovery costs. As a result, the irrational selection of the defendant to
serve as the sole subsidizer therefore violates the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause.
The following Section explains why, at the point in the
proceeding that the defendant-producer is required to subsidize the
plaintiff-requestor's discovery costs, the defendant has not been
afforded procedural due process on the issue of his fault or liability.
From that conclusion flows all other relevant conclusions justifying a
finding that the required subsidization is unconstitutional. First, I will
describe the alternative theoretical foundations that scholars suggest
as the underpinning of procedural due process. I conclude that it makes
no difference which of the two major theoretical approaches one chooses
to adopt, since under either theoretical model it is clear that at the point
at which the forced subsidization takes place the defendant has not
been provided with the requisite procedural protections to
constitutionally justify even a preliminary conclusion of fault. At that
point I will explore the implications of modern Supreme Court doctrine,
which dictate the exact same conclusion.
ii. The Theory of Procedural Due Process: Implications for
Defendant Producer-Pays Discovery
There are basically two often-conflicting theoretical foundations
to rationalize the guarantee of procedural due process. The first-and
the one currently employed by the Supreme Court in shaping its
doctrinal approach 42-iS the utilitarian model. Under this model, all
that matters is attaining the most accurate conclusion in the most
42.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see discussion infra Section III.B.2.c.iii.
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efficient manner. 43 To achieve that end, this approach dictates use of a
pragmatic analysis which balances the interests of the parties, the
extent to which accuracy is threatened by the lack of procedural
protections, and the burdens on government that would result from
insertion of those protections.
In contrast to such a starkly utilitarian approach, many years
ago Professor Jerry Mashaw fashioned his "dignitary" theory of
procedural due process, an approach that focuses on noninstrumental
values which, he argues, are properly seen to underlie the
constitutional guarantee. 44 From this normative perspective, the mere
fact that the process provided is likely to reach an accurate decision is
at best a necessary rather than a sufficient condition to satisfy due
process. Instead, the defendant must also be given the opportunity to
participate in his own defense. In the words of Professor Frank
Michelman,
A participatory opportunity may ... be psychologically important to the individual: to
have played a part in, to have made one's apt contribution to, decisions which are about
oneself may be counted important even though the decision, as it turns out, is the most
45
unfavorable one imaginable and one's efforts have not proved influential.

Note that mutual exclusivity between these two theoretical
models of procedural due process does not necessarily exist. It is
certainly conceivable that a utilitarian approach would usually satisfy
the dictates of a dignitary approach. Indeed, on occasion the Court has
chosen to ignore a slavish allegiance to decisional accuracy in favor of
an approach focused primarily on dignitary concerns. The classic
example is the area of coerced confessions, where the fact that as a
result of coercion a suspect has accurately revealed the location of a
victim's body, thereby likely establishing his own guilt, will not prevent
a coerced confession from being deemed a due process violation.46
From either theoretical perspective, it should be clear that
penalizing a defendant at the discovery stage on the assumption of some
finding of fault contravenes both normative models of procedural due
process. The only bases for such a finding at that point are the
unilateral, unproven factual allegations made by a self-interested
party-the plaintiff in her complaint. This is hardly grounds to find by
43. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986).
44. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.
L. REV. 885, 899 (1981).
45. Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE
PROCESS: NOMOS XVIII, at 126, 127-28 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
46. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding that "the use of the
confessions [obtained by police violence] as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial
of due process").
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even a probability that the defendant is at fault, much less viable proof.
This is true both as a utilitarian matter and a dignitary matter. As a
utilitarian matter, because it is impossible to make any determination
of fault on the basis of unilateral, self-interested, unproven allegations,
the accuracy of any conclusion of fault is of course highly suspect. From
a dignitary perspective, the defendant has been given no opportunity to
challenge the accuracy of the plaintiffs self-interested allegations
because the plaintiff has not yet provided convincing proof of the
defendant's fault. This is not a criticism of the plaintiff; it simply means
that at the discovery stage-the point at which the defendant's property
is taken to subsidize the plaintiffs discovery-the litigation system does
not allow for such proof. That inquiry comes at a later stage in the
process. 47
Absent any opportunity for the defendant to challenge the truth
of the plaintiffs allegations, there is no assurance of an accurate
determination or assumption of the defendant's fault to justify the
deprivation of his property. Such an approach, then, quite clearly
contravenes the foundation of the utilitarian model of procedural due
process. Nor does it satisfy the requirements of the dignitary model.
How can the litigant's dignity be preserved when he is denied any
opportunity to participate to challenge the accuracy of the plaintiffs
claims or to disprove their truth?
iii. Procedural Due Process Doctrine: Implications for Defendant
Producer-Pays Discovery
Not surprisingly, given the clear implications of procedural due
process theory, controlling Supreme Court doctrine similarly dictates
discovery is
defendant
producer-pays
the conclusion
that
unconstitutional. As far back as its 1972 decision in Fuentes v. Shevin,
the Court has made clear that "[t]he constitutional right to be heard is
a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of
decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions." 4 8
The Court explained this conclusion in the following manner: "The
purpose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to
the individual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property .

. . ."49

The

Court further established that "a fair process of decisionmaking"
47.
FED. R.
48.
49.

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law, both before and after verdict);
CIV. P. 56 (summary judgment).
407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
Id. at 80-81.
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necessarily included the stipulation that "[p]arties whose rights are to
be affected are entitled to be heard."5 0 In the discovery cost allocation
context, because the defendant is being deprived of his property without
ever being given a meaningful opportunity to dispute his fault, it is
beyond doubt that the current producer-pays system violates the
foundational premises of procedural due process set out in Fuentes.
The Supreme Court has never overruled its foundational
statements in Fuentes. However, the Court's procedural due process
doctrine took a major step with the formal adoption of a starkly
utilitarian calculus in its 1976 decision, Mathews v. Eldridge.1 The
Court's test included a blend of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
52
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Conspicuously absent from the Court's calculus was any concern over
the type of dignitary values about which Professor Mashaw was so
concerned. 53 Nevertheless, with only minor subsequent modification,5 4
this test continues to control.
Applying the Mathews factors to defendant producer-pays
discovery (and adopting the premise that the only constitutionally valid
justification for making a defendant subsidize what are properly
deemed the plaintiffs discovery costs is that the defendant is somehow
at fault), the most important consideration is likely the second-"the
risk of an erroneous deprivation" absent further safeguards.5 5 Absent
some meaningful inquiry into the truth or falsity of the plaintiffs selfserving allegations and an opportunity for the defendant to challenge
any proffered proof of his fault, it is impossible to have any assurance
that the wholly unsupported assumption of the defendant's wrongdoing
is accurate.
Measuring the government's interest is arguably somewhat
more complicated. There is no issue of providing greater procedural
protection to the defendant at the discovery stage that might increase
the administrative costs to the government. The probable effect of
depriving the defendant of his property is simply to make the plaintiff
pay the costs of the discovery he has requested and that benefits only
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 80.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
Mashaw, supra note 44, at 899; see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
See discussion infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
424 U.S. at 335.
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him. True, if the plaintiff cannot afford that discovery, the plaintiff will
never be able to obtain that information. But that ignores another
conceivable alternative: creation of a societal fund to subsidize the costs
of the discovery. One might argue that creation and operation of such a
fund does in fact impose significant administrative burdens on the
government. But surely that fact cannot, as a matter of equal
protection, justify random imposition of that full cost on an individual
litigant for whom there is no basis to rationalize selecting him out for
special treatment. In any event, the government's interest in avoiding
administrative burdens is not avoided simply by imposing the costs of
the plaintiff-requestor's discovery on the defendant-producer.
In its subsequent decision in Connecticut v. Doehr, the Court
expanded the Mathews test somewhat.56 In Mathews, the only parties
involved were the claimant and the government. By contrast, Doehr
involved two private parties-a plaintiff and a defendant. Hence the
Court quite reasonably expanded the Mathews test to include an
inquiry into the impact on the plaintiff as well as the defendant in a
purely private litigation.5 7 Thus, it might be argued that the negative
impact on the plaintiff caused by its financial inability to obtain
discovery from the defendant must now be taken into account in
conducting the Mathews utilitarian calculus. But such reasoning
dangerously proves too much. Nothing, of course, prevents the plaintiff
from conducting the discovery if he pays for it-much as a litigant is
required to incur its costs in managing litigation. By this reasoning,
then, a defendant could be required to pay an indigent litigant's
litigation costs-clearly an extreme result.
The final factor-the "private interest" impacted by the "official
action" (that is, imposition of the plaintiffs discovery costs on the
defendant without any basis for assuming defendant's fault)-arguably
suggests a sliding scale. The more expensive the discovery that the
plaintiff requests, the greater the need for an accurate decision. But
because requiring the defendant to pay for the plaintiffs discovery costs
absent showing the slightest evidentiary basis of the defendant's fault
or wrongdoing is so unlikely to produce an accurate result, even
imposition of a small discovery cost on the defendant cannot be justified
as a matter of utilitarian calculus. Discovery must require some hearing
before a defendant may be deprived of its property,5 8 and in the case of
the current producer-pays discovery cost allocation model, the

56.
57.
58.

501 U.S. 1 (1991).
Id. at 10-11.
Redish & Marshall, supra note 43, at 475.
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defendant is forced to subsidize the plaintiffs discovery costs with no
hearing at all.
It should be recalled that the discovery stage is reached only
after the defendant has had a full opportunity to move to dismiss a
plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 59
But as previously explained, this opportunity cannot possibly be
considered a meaningful hearing, since such a motion assumes, solely
for purposes of argument, the truth of the plaintiffs nonconclusory
allegations.6 0 In Doehr, the Court expressly rejected consideration of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as an adequate hearing
designed to assure accuracy of decisionmaking. "Permitting a court to
authorize

attachment

[of a defendant's

property] .

.

. because

the

plaintiff can make out a facially valid complaint," the Court stated,
"would permit the deprivation of the defendant's property when the
claim would fail to convince a jury [or] when it rested on factual
allegations that were sufficient to state a cause of action but which the
defendant would dispute . . . ."61 The Court added that "[i]t is selfevident that the judge could make no realistic assessment concerning
the likelihood of an action's success based upon these one-sided, selfserving, and conclusory submissions," 62 also noting that "even a
detailed affidavit would give only the plaintiffs version of the
confrontation." 6 3 Thus, at least as a doctrinal matter if not also as a
matter of common sense, the question of whether the opportunity to
move to dismiss can be considered an adequate hearing has now been
foreclosed.
One might suggest that in order to rationalize the defendant
producer-pays model as a matter of equal protection, it should be
deemed sufficient that only probable cause of the defendant's fault be
shown. Determinative proof of such fault, the argument proceeds, need
not be established. But even conceding this point solely for purposes of
argument, this softening of what needs to be established prior to the
deprivation of the defendant's property helps in reducing neither the
equal protection nor procedural due process problems of the current cost
allocation model. With the only procedural opportunity for a defendant
to challenge the assumption of its fault being the wholly inadequate

59. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see discussion supra Section III.B.2.b.
60. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (assuming factual allegations
as true for the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
61. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 13-14.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id.
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion,64 there exists no basis, at the point of discovery,
65
even to make a finding of probable cause of a defendant's fault.
One might also suggest that the constitutional problem I raise,
even if it is assumed to be correct, can be dealt with simply by
authorizing postresolution compensation. If the plaintiff wins, then
there would be no need for such compensation, since the necessary
finding of the defendant's fault would be made. If the defendant wins,
the due process problem could be solved by then requiring that the
plaintiff reimburse the defendant for the costs of discovery that did not
aid the defendant in preparation of his case. It is true that the courts
on occasion upheld postdeprivation due process in situations in which
it is infeasible to provide a predeprivation hearing. 66 But in the context
of defendant producer-pays discovery, this line of decisions is irrelevant
for a number of reasons. First of all, it should be noted that this is not
our system: even a victorious defendant has no legal right to recover
costs-even those that were properly deemed to be the costs of the
plaintiff requesting party. Moreover, even if a defendant were given
such a right, he would be faced with an impenetrable Catch-22: The
only situations in which it would arguably be rational to transfer the
plaintiffs discovery costs to the defendant would be those in which the
plaintiff could not afford to pay those costs. 6 7 But it is in just these
situations that a postdeprivation hearing would be meaningless for the
simple reason that a losing plaintiff would be financially unable to
reimburse the defendant. Thus, the fact that the defendant will
ultimately be given the opportunity for his subsidization of the
plaintiffs costs does not moot the need for some sort of meaningful
hearing at the time the forced subsidization takes place.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
DEFENDANT PRODUCER-PAYS MODEL: A RESPONSE

In an interesting and provocative article, Professor Benjamin
Spencer has challenged the conclusion that defendant producer-pays

64. See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b.
65. In Doehr, the Court found the availability of a motion to dismiss to be a constitutionally
inadequate basis on which to determine even a finding of probable cause of defendant's liability on
the merits. 501 U.S. at 13-14.
66. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) ("The prior cases which have excused the priorhearing requirement [of due process] have rested in part on the availability of some meaningful
opportunity subsequent to the initial taking for a determination of rights and liabilities."),
overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parratt'sholding
that lack of due care can constitute a deprivation of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
67. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
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discovery cost allocation is unconstitutional. 68 Because Professor
Spencer's arguments are, I believe, worthy of careful consideration, I
have chosen to respond to them here.
Professor Spencer first argues-quite correctly-that "[t]o the
extent that the litigation expenses in question are expended for the
benefit of the party incurring the cost, no constitutionally cognizable
deprivation can be said to have occurred." 69 As I have already made
clear, 70 I fully agree with this statement. There would have to be some
sort of judicially supervised process to allocate costs between plaintiffs
and defendants. But none of that alters the fact that the constitutional
problem remains for discovery produced by the defendant that benefits
the defendant not at all.
Professor Spencer runs into problems, however, when he asserts
the following:
[Wlhen the information produced tends to confirm the defendant-producer's
liability ... [the constitutional argument against the producer-pays model] should fail
because the producer has unclean hands; a litigant should have no equitable claim to a
right to withhold information tending to refute its litigation position or to saddle the
requester with the expense of discovering such information.71

What does "unclean hands" have to do with a constitutional
challenge to a judicial practice when no equitable relief is sought? True,
unclean hands will traditionally prevent a party from invoking equity.
But when we speak of constitutional rights, traditional limits on the
availability of equitable relief have no relevance when such relief is not
requested. In any event, while it would be a waste of time to debate the
esoteric historical limits of equity, I seriously doubt that the strategic
benefit of discovery to the plaintiff would render the defendant guilty of
unclean hands in the first place. But that is beside the point when no
equitable relief is sought. Just as important a failure in Professor
Spencer's argument is his incorrect assumption that the issue is
whether the defendant is allowed to withhold the information in
question. No one is arguing that the defendant has a right to withhold
information; the only issue is whether the defendant can summarily be
forced to subsidize what are properly seen as the plaintiffs costs in
producing that information.
As weak as Professor Spencer's "unclean hands" argument is, his
next contention degenerates into naked question-begging and logical
circularity. "[I]f the information has evidentiary value in a live dispute,"
he reasons, "the court and all parties are entitled to access it, and those
68.
69.
70.
71.

Spencer, supra note 1.
Id. at 786.
See supra note 25.
Spencer, supra note 1, at 788-89.
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in possession of the information have a duty to provide it."72 But that is
the very issue that is the subject of debate-hardly a persuasive
response. In any event, at least as a historical matter, Professor Spencer
is simply wrong. Until promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, the understanding was the exact opposite of
Professor Spencer's conclusory assertion. It was only then that
widespread compelled discovery was introduced into the federal civil
litigation system. Prior to that point, parties had absolutely no "duty"
to provide such information to their litigation opponent.
Professor Spencer's final argument is that "the due process
provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse
effects of governmental action." 73 He reasons that "the incidents of
complying with properly instituted judicial action may not be cast as
deprivations warranting due process protections." 74 He is certainly
correct in suggesting that incidental financial costs from complying
with governmental orders are generally not viewed as deprivations of
property for purposes of either the Takings or Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth Amendment. 75 But that is not the issue. The question, rather,
is whether a defendant can be forced to absorb litigation costs that are
not properly his own, as a means of subsidizing his private opponent.
Rather than incur a procedural cost that "is a part of the necessary
contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public," 76 the

defendant is being made to transfer his wealth to another private
party-the very party that is suing him. This is a far cry from a
defendant being forced to absorb the costs of preparing his own defense
or to comply with a governmental investigation.
CONCLUSION

When the dust settles, the conclusion that the current producerpays model of discovery cost allocation, at least when applied to
defendants, violates both equal protection and procedural due process
protections embodied in the Constitution is inescapable. Any legitimate
legal or moral theory must view the costs incurred in ferreting out
information that assists one party to a litigation as that party's cost,

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 789.
Id. at 791 (quoting O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 (1980)).
Id. at 792.
U.S. CONST. amend. V, c1s. 4-5.
Spencer, supra note 1, at 793 (quoting United States v.. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
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even if another party must initially bear the expense of producing that
information. 77
It may well be appropriate, as a political or moral matter, for the
government to wish to subsidize a plaintiffs discovery costs (though
counterarguments also exist).78 But absent some determination of the
defendant's fault or wrongdoing, there exists no rational basis on which
to selectively impose that cost on the defendant to the litigation rather
than spread the cost among all taxpayers. By way of analogy, recall the
hypothetical mentioned previously: a legislative plan under which all of
the plaintiffs discovery will be subsidized by one person, to be chosen
by means of a random drawing.7 9 Despite the absence of a suspect
classification, such a wholly irrational classification would have to be
deemed a violation of equal protection. Unless the defendant has been
proven to be at fault (or, at the very least, probable cause of his fault
has been established),8 0 he is in no different position from the
unfortunate individual selected through the hypothetical random
drawing. But at the discovery stage, the defendant has not been
provided with anything even approaching a meaningful hearing to
challenge the proof of his fault. Indeed, no evidence of his fault has even
been introduced, and no independent adjudicator has made any
determination of fault following such a hearing. To make a defendant
incur the unreimbursed costs of the plaintiffs discovery, then,
simultaneously constitutes a violation of both equal protection and
procedural due process.
Admittedly, constitutional restraints on the operation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have generally played at best only a
limited role in controlling abuses of the process. But in situations such
as this one, where the violation of the defendant's constitutional rights
is stark and unambiguous, we owe it to our constitutional system and
the premise of constitutional supremacy to assure that the process
complies with such important constitutional directives.

77. See discussion supra Part III. See generally Redish & McNamara, supra note 2
(explaining the current approach of the U.S. legal system requires the producing party to bear all
costs associated with a discovery request).
78. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 788-90 (responding to the argument that parties are being
forced to subsidize their adversaries without due process).
79. See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
80. See discussion supra Part III.

